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This Article analyzes cartel criminalization in Europe from a
deterrence and institutional perspective. First, it investigates the idea
of criminalization by putting it in perspective with the more general
question of what types of sanctions a jurisdiction might adopt against
collusive behavior. Second, it analyzes the institutional element of
criminalization by (1) discussing the compatibility of administrative
enforcement with the potential de facto criminal nature of
administrative fines under European law and (2) evaluating the
trade-offs between an administrative and a criminal model of
enforcement. Although a "panoply" of sanctions against both
corporations and individuals may be necessary under a deterrence
perspective, this Article suggests that individual sanctions are unlikely
to become a priority in Europe without a prior willingness to reform
the current model of enforcement to increase the levels of due process.
The debate concerning the right to a fair trial in antitrust proceedings
and reforms to improve the efficiency-due process trade-off could be
leveraged to open the door to the introduction of individual sanctions
at the European level.
* S.J.D. Candidate, University of Toronto. Toronto, M5S 2C5, Canada. Email:
francesco.ducci@mail.utoronto.ca. The author is grateful to Michael Trebilcock for
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper and to the participants in the
2016 SIDE-ISLE Law and Economics Conference.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The global trend against cartels, driven by the widespread
consensus about the harmfulness of such practices for economies and
consumers, has resulted in the introduction of criminal offenses in
many competition law regimes around the world.'
In many jurisdictions, like Canada and the United States, a
number of antitrust provisions fall within a criminal law regime. In
Canada, by virtue of Sections 45 and 47 of the Competition Act, hard-
core cartels and bid rigging are subject to criminal sanctions and
considered per se illegal, unless the parties accused can prove that the
agreement in question is ancillary to a broader or separate principal
agreement that includes the same parties and is reasonably
necessary for the implementation of the principal agreement.
2
Following a bifurcated judicial model for criminal violations, the
Competition Bureau investigates criminal offenses and remits the
1. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCI
CONCERNING EFFECTIVE ACTION AGAINST HARD CORE CARTELS (1998),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/2350130.pdf [https://perma.cclRZJ7-GZLS]
(archived Nov. 7, 2017).
2. Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-34 (Can.) [hereinafter Competition Act].
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prosecution of criminal cases to the Federal Director of Public
Prosecution. Cases are heard in ordinary criminal courts.3
In the United States, violation of the Sherman Act is a felony.
Both corporations and individuals can be sanctioned and individuals
can be sentenced to prison.4 The Antitrust Division of the Department
of Justice is in charge of prosecuting criminal actions in the federal
courts of general jurisdiction.
On the other side of the Atlantic, the European antitrust regime
does not contain criminal sanctions. The European Commission can
impose only administrative fines on undertakings but cannot impose
criminal punishment on individuals.5 However, in line with
international trends, the Commission has recognized anti-cartel
policies as one of its priorities, leading to a significant increase in the
level of fines imposed on undertakings, wider use of leniency regimes,
and settlement procedures.6
At the same time, there has been a significant debate over
whether competition law fines should be treated as de facto criminal
under the autonomous definition contained in Article 6(1) of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (ECHR).7
Many concerns have been raised as to whether the current
enforcement model with an administrative body in charge of
investigative, adjudicative, and enforcement functions is adequate to
ensure a right to a fair trial.8 To date, the European Court of Human
Rights (ECtHR) has confirmed the compatibility of the current
integrated agency model with due process requirements, indicating
that an integrated agency model is compatible with Article 6 as long
as strong procedural guarantees are in place and a body with "full
jurisdiction" exercises sufficient judicial control.9 Despite the
3. Eleanor M. Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Design of Competition Law
Institutions and the Global Convergence of Process Norms: The Gal Competition Project
24-25 (N.Y.U. Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 304, 2012).
4. Donald I. Baker, Punishment for Cartel Participants in the US: A Special
Model?, in CRIMINALISING CARTELS: CRITICAL STUDIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY MOVEMENT 27 (Caron Beaton-Wells & Ariel Ezrachi eds., 2011).
5. Council Regulation 1/03/EC on the Implementation of the Rules on
Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 2003 O.J. (L1) 1.
6. See Press Release, European Commission, Fighting Against Cartels: A
Priority for the Present and for the Future (Apr. 3, 2014) (declaring that the fight
against cartels is a priority for the Commission and describing anti-cartel policy
measures).
7. The term "criminal" has its own distinct meaning in ECHR case law. See
Case of Engel and Others v. The Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4 (1976)
(distinguishing "criminal" from "disciplinary" law).
8. Ian Forrester, Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished
Institution with Flawed Procedures, 34 EUR. L. REV. 817, 821 (2009); Wouter P.J. Wils,
The Increased Level of EU Antitrust Fines, Judicial Review and the European
Convention on Human Rights, 33(1) WORLD COMPETITION 1 (2010).
9. See A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L v. Italy, No. 43509/08, Eur. Ct. H.R.
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-106438
[https://perma.cc/3UNP-KKSS] (archived Nov. 7, 2017).
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numerous criticisms surrounding the margin of appreciation that the
EU courts extend to the Commission's "complex and factual economic
assessments," the standards of judicial review have been recognized
as ECHR standards compliant.1 0
This Article addresses the question of cartel criminalization on
two interrelated levels. First, it analyzes the deficiencies of a sanction
regime based solely on administrative fines on corporations as a
policy instrument to effectively deter collusive behavior. In doing so,
it discusses possible theoretical justifications for introducing criminal
sanctions, and it evaluates a variety of antitrust sanctions that a
jurisdiction may impose on firms and individuals. Second, it
addresses the institutional design aspect of criminalization. In
particular, it asks whether an administrative integrated agency
model is compatible with current high levels of administrative
monetary fines, wh'ich have been categorized as de facto criminal in
nature. Finally, it analyzes the trade-offs entailed in switching from
an administrative to a criminal system of enforcement.
This Article argues that despite the high desirability of
introducing sanctions against both firms and individuals at the
European level in order to ensure sufficient deterrence of cartels,
such policy is unlikely to be acceptable as a stand-alone reform.
Conversely, the focus should be on current shortcomings and possible
reforms to the current institutional system of enforcement. Although
changes in institutional design may also prove politically and legally
daunting and subject to issues of path dependence," the present
shortfalls in terms of procedural fairness and the potential
improvement of the efficiency-due process trade-off that could arise
from switching to a bifurcated judicial model12 may provide strong
justifications for a deeper institutional change. As it is argued below,
only the desirability of such broader reform at the institutional level13
could bring about the possibility of -introducing individual sanctions
against cartels.
10. See, e.g., id.; KME Germany AG v. European Commission, 2011 C.M.L.R.
275, 279.
11. See generally Mariana M. Prado & Michael J. Trebilcock, Path
Dependence, Development, and the Dynamics of Institutional Reform (Univ. of
Toronto, Legal Studies Working Paper No. 09-04, 2009),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1415040 [https://perma.cc/MAV2-J4SW] (archived Nov. 8,
2017) (chronicling challenges in prior efforts toward reforms).
12. See Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. lacobucci, Designing Competition
Law Institutions: Values, Structures, and Mandate, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 455, 461-63
(2010).
13. For a discussion on the institutional structure and performance of the
European competition law regime, see loannis Lianos & Arianna Andreangeli, The
European Union: The Competition Law System and the Union's Norms, in THE DESIGN
OF COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTIONS, GLOBAL NORMS, LOCAL CHOICES 384 (Eleanor M.
Fox & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013).
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Part II begins by discussing the two main rationales for
criminalization of cartels14-retribution and deterrence.'5 Starting
from the recognition that it would be virtually impossible to increase
monetary fines to a high enough level to match the marginal benefits
of entering into a cartel agreement, Part III analyses the potential
deterrent effect of various civil and criminal sanctions on both
corporations and individuals. Part IV discusses the potential de facto
nature of monetary fines in antitrust cases, the institutional reforms
required to comply with a criminal law system by identifying the
advantages and disadvantages of a bifurcated judicial model
compared to an integrated agency model, and the trade-off between
administrative efficiency and due process. Part V concludes.
II. CRIMINALIZING CARTELS
Two main justifications are relevant for antitrust
criminalization-retribution theory and deterrence theory.16
Retribution theory generally justifies criminal sanctions on the basis
of the moral wrong committed by individuals. Deterrence theory, on
the other hand, has been widely used to justify criminal sanctions in
order to achieve optimal deterrence and prevention of future criminal
activities.17
Most of the academic debate justifying criminalization of hard-
core antitrust offenses has generally been based on deterrence.'8
Nonetheless, the two rationales are not mutually exclusive. In fact,
the identification of cartel activity with a "morally wrongful" behavior
and the wider public's awareness of the inherent harmfulness of
price-fixing and similar practices would strongly increase the
argument in favor of criminalization. Further, finding some grounds
for criminalization of cartels on the basis of retribution may, at the
same time, enhance the deterrent effect of antitrust criminal
14. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Gregory J. Werden & Marilyn J. M. Simon,
Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 917 (1987).
15. See Case T-329/01, Archer Daniels Midland v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. II-
3255, 1 141 ("Both the deterrent effect and the punitive effect of the fine are reasons
why the Commission should be able to impose a fine.").
16. See generally PETER WHELAN, THE CRIMINALIZATION OF EUROPEAN CARTEL
ENFORCEMENT 25-111 (2014). But see Brent Fisse, Reconstructing Corporate Criminal
Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault, and Sanctions, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1141, 1145
(1983).
17. Becker, supra note 14, at 45; For earlier work of classical philosophers, see
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT 14 (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
18. See Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and
Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 696 (2001) [hereinafter
Baker, Use of Criminal Law Remedies]; Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright,
Antitrust Sanctions, 6 COMPETITION POLT INT'L 3, 4 (2010).
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sanctions by enhancing the moral stigma associated with cartels.
Finally, aligning cartel activity with fraud, cheating, or stealing
would also increase the argument for a criminal rather than an
administrative model of enforcement. This Part discusses these
theories, the validity and limitations of their application to cartel
activity, and the efficacy of antitrust fines for deterrent purposes.
A. Retribution
Theories of criminal law based on retribution, rather than
prevention of crimes, adopt a backward-looking approach, which
focuses on the moral wrongs committed by individuals, irrespective of
the impact of sanctions upon future level of crimes.19 Retribution
theories see human beings as responsible for their actions and
require offenders to receive what they deserve when engaging in
wrongful behavior.20 The moral content is composed by elements of
culpability, social harmfulness, and moral wrongfulness.21
Retribution requires that punishment should be proportional to the
offense and to the culpability of the offender.22 Criminalization based
on retribution theories would start from a recognition that cartels are
different and more harmful compared to other anti-competitive
practices. Of all behaviors that may negatively affect competition,
cartels strongly contradict the principles of free market economy and
create harmful consequences for consumers and society. In contrast to
many unilateral practices and to mergers, cartels are "naked"
restraints of trade: they restrict competition without producing any
objective countervailing positive effect. Accordingly, it may be argued
that they deserve the same moral condemnation associated with
other fraudulent practices. Retribution theory could therefore justify
cartel criminalization by association with some form of culpability,
social harmfulness, and moral wrongfulness.23 Cartels may be
considered to create a social harm stemming from undermining the
operation of competitive markets; cartels may be thought of as a form
of criminal behavior analogous to theft, fraud, or cheating.
Although valid in their own terms, these are somewhat
problematic interpretations. For instance, the harm of collusion is
usually diluted among many victims, as each affected party bears
only a fraction of the harm, which in some cases may be very small.
19. See generally DAVID BOONIN, THE PROBLEM OF PUNISHMENT (2008); Alison
Jones & Rebecca A. Williams, The UK Response to the Global Effort Against Cartels: Is
Criminalization Really the Solution?, J. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 1 (2014).
20. Werden & Simon, supra note 14, at 930-31.
21. WHELAN, supra note 16, at 83.
22. Proportionality can be ordinal (a comparison between the punishment to
offenses of like gravity) or cardinal (where the severity of punishment is determined
according to the gravity of the offence).
23. WHELAN, supra note 16, at 84.
6 [VOL. 51:1
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Cartel activity may therefore be considered similar to a "victimless
crime," where the aggregate harm is significant but the impact on
individual victims may be minimal and victims may not even be
aware of the crime. In addition, the viability of a retributive
justification for criminalization depends also on the social perception
of these collusive interferences with competitive market mechanisms
as morally reprehensible and worthy of criminal punishment. The
historical differences in the acceptance of the idea of free markets
between the two sides of the Atlantic provide some explanation for
the different legal treatment of cartels. North American legal systems
appear to reflect a general moral reprobation associated with naked
collusive practices that explicitly prevent market mechanisms from
operating and are perceived as a fraud operated by producers to the
detriment of consumers and society at large. On the other hand, the
different legal tradition in Europe reflects a morally neutral
perception of cartel activity and skepticism to applying criminal law
to market-related distortions. The lack of adequate strong societal
perception against certain market behavior carries with it strong
limitations and potential counterproductive effects associated with
the criminalization process. In this regard, institutional efforts to
raise awareness in the wider public of the harmfulness of such
collusive activities may foster the strength of a retribution-based
theory of criminalization. Despite these limitations, retribution may
still provide a valid theoretical justification for associating cartels
with similar forms of criminal behavior.
B. Deterrence
The rationale for deterrence theory can be traced back to
utilitarianism, which assumes that punishment can be justified only
if its imposition increases social benefit or utility. 24 This approach,
consequentialist in nature, justifies punishment only if it prevents or
reduces future crimes and considers punishment as a way to
maximize social utility or welfare to be employed only when the
utility of imposing a criminal punishment is higher than the disutility
of its application.25
Becker, in the seminal work Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach,2 6 introduced the application of economic analysis
to criminal punishment, which can be seen as a variant of classic
utilitarianism, where happiness is substituted by maximization of
24. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Jonathan Bennett ed., 2017) (1781) (outlining the
theoretical foundations of utilitarianism).
25. Deterrence may be distinguished between 'general' and 'special.' In the
context of cartels, general deterrence is the most significant one.
26. Becker, supra note 14.
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wealth.2 7 A theory of economic deterrence assumes that individuals
and undertakings are rational actors acting in their own self-interest
in order to maximize their own welfare and that the main social goal
to be achieved is the maximization of economic efficiency.28
Accordingly, social welfare is achieved when the marginal benefit of
punishment equals the marginal cost.2 9
Two variants of deterrence theory can be found in the
literature:3 0 The first approach (gain-based deterrence)3 ' sets
deterrence at the point where punishment equals at least the gain of
the offender. Accordingly, the optimal fine exceeds the gain of the
offender multiplied by the inverse of the probability of apprehension,
or:
1
F* GOffender X pAppretension
This model assumes that cartel behavior can never be efficient or
beneficial to society32 and therefore aims at eliminating all
violations.3 3 The second variant (harm-based deterrence)34 would
instead compare punishment to the harm to society, rather than the
gains of the offender, as a way to internalize the externality inflicted
on society. According to this second approach, not all harmful
activities must be deterred, but only inefficient ones.35
Although these two variants of the deterrent model have been
debated in the literature, the difference between them is not relevant
for the purpose of the analysis that follows, since in both cases the
resulting monetary penalties would be at risk of being ineffective and
could justify at least theoretically the imposition of criminal
sanctions. As explained in more detail below, the reason for this is
that fines calculated using overcharge proxies that are adopted in
27. See Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 104-05 (1979).
28. See generally Michael J. Trebilcock, The Lessons and Limits of Law and
Economics, in IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER 113 (Pierre Nadeau ed., 2007).
29. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 497, 510, 513 (4th
ed. 2003).
30. Becker, supra note 14; William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust
Violations, 50 UNIv. CHI. L. REV. 652 (1983); Wouter P.J. Wils, Optimal Antitrust
Fines: Theory and Practice, 29 WORLD COMPETITION 183 (2006).
31. See generally Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be
Based on the Harm to the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer? 10 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 427
(1994).
32. Karen Yeung, Quantifying Regulatory Penalties: Australian Competition
Law Penalties in Perspective, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 440, 448 (1999).
33. Wils, supra note 30, at 191.
34. This approach was advocated for by Becker, supra note 14, at 5.
35. See WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM:
AN EcONOMIC ANALYSIS 5 (1986) ("Efficient enforcement does not imply deterrence of
all antitrust violations when there are enforcement costs"); Landes, supra note 30, at
655 ("The purpose of penalties, following Becker's model of crime and punishment, is to
deter inefficient offenses, not efficient ones.").
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many fining guidelines are usually significantly below the actual
overcharge. In addition, the possibility of increasing fines to achieve
optimal deterrence is often limited by corporations' inability to pay.
Under a deterrence perspective, therefore, criminalization may
be justified on the ground that monetary fines imposed on
corporations are inadequate in preventing or reducing cartel activity.
In fact, most of the legal debate relating to the criminalization of
cartels has been based on deterrence,36 on the ground that the
amount of imposable fines, often capped at a maximum, and the lack
of strong social stigma that is usually associated with criminal
sanctions are in practice insufficient to deter illegal behavior, as the
gains of cartels often exceed the risk of getting caught and the
amount of fines. As some authors have pointed out, collusion is often
a lucrative business from an ex post perspective.3 7
When monetary fines are the only available policy instrument, a
low probability of detection could be offset by an increase in the
amount of the fine imposed in order to avoid under-deterrence and to
reduce the costs of punishment and enforcement. Alternatively,
deterrence may be achieved by raising the probability of detection.3 8
However, increasing the level of fines creates problems associated
with over-deterrence, proportional justice, and constraints imposed by
companies' ability to pay. At the same time, neither corporate fines
nor a higher probability of detection can, by themselves, satisfactorily
address the specific incentives that operate at an individual level. In
this regard, individual sanctions can reduce problems related to
firms' inability to pay, principal-agent relations, lack of moral stigma,
and incentives to cooperate through leniency programs. Among them,
criminal sanctions would have the advantage of significantly
increasing the social moral stigma associated with cartels while
introducing individual criminal liability, which appears to be a
forceful source of deterrence especially for white-collar crimes.
A deterrence approach toward criminalization has two major
limitations. First, deterrence theory is based on the assumptions that
individuals act rationally and that undertakings are risk-neutral,
rather than risk-averse or risk-preferring. Proving the validity of
these conditions may complicate the analysis, as robust empirical
evidence regarding these assumptions is often lacking. The other
major shortfall is that applying criminal law to what a society
considers a morally neutral behavior may pose the risk of
delegitimizing criminal law through its excessive use.
36. Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 18, at 7.
37. Florian Smuda, Cartel Overcharges and the Deterrent Effect of EU
Competition Law, 10 J. COMPETITION L. ECON. 63, 64 (2014).
38. John M. Connor & Robert Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy:
Crime Pays, 34 CARDoZO L. REV. 427, 479 (2012); Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. EcON.
REV. 880, 885 (1979).
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Despite such problematic aspects, an argument can be made in
favor of criminalization from a deterrence perspective by
acknowledging that a system of enforcement that relies exclusively on
monetary penalties on corporations must set the amount of fines at a
level that often exceeds the ability to pay by corporations and fails to
effectively deter cartels. In this regard, Wils,39 assuming a "gain to
the offender" rather than a "harm to society" standard, argued that
the optimal fine in Europe would be, at minimum, 150 percent of the
firm's annual turnover in the product market affected by the
violation, and subsequent studies yield estimates even higher than
200 percent.4 0 The 150 percent amount was obtained by setting the
size of the gain to 5 percent,4 1 the average cartel length to five years,
and the probability of detection at one-sixth. Multiplying the gain by
the duration, and dividing it by the probability of getting caught, the
result is an optimal fine of 150 percent of annual turnover.
C. Empirical Data
A survey of empirical studies on price-fixing overcharges
indicates that the amount of the penalties required to achieve
deterrence may be even higher than the one suggested by Wils.42 This
challenges the fact that many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using
penalty guidelines that assume an arbitrary 10 percent overcharge.43
Smuda reports that in Europe, in a sample of 191 overcharge
estimates, the mean and median overcharge rates were 20.70 percent
and 18.37 percent of the selling price, and the average cartel duration
was 8.35 years,44 whereas Connor and Lande4 5 find that the average
overcharge was between 28 to 54 percent, and the lifespan of a cartel
was between seven and eight years. Connor,46 in a 2014 study on
international price-fixing, surveyed more than seven hundred
39. WOUTER P.J. WILS, OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF EC ANTITRUST LAW: A
STUDY IN LAW AND EcoNOMIcs 22-28, 203-04 (2001).
40. See id. at 203-04; Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let the
Punishment Fit the Crime, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 19, 30 (2009) (noting that most
businesses would not be able to pay the optimal fine).
41. The size of the estimated mark-up was 10 percent, but because demand
elasticity was set at zero, the increase in profit was set at 5 percent.
42. Peter G. Bryant & Edwin Eckhard, Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting
Caught, 73 REV. ECON. STAT. 531, 535 (1991); John M. Connor, Private International
Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anti-Cartel Enforcement (Dep't. of Agric. Econ.,
Purdue Univ., Staff Paper No. 03-12, 2003).
43. JOHN M. CONNOR, PRICE-FIXING OVERCHARGES: REVISED THIRD EDITION 1
(2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2400780 [https://perma.cc/
7MPR-FR33] (archived Nov. 8, 2017).
44. Smuda, supra note 37.
45. John M. Connor & Robert Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices?
Implications for Reform of the Antitrust Sentencing Guidelines, 80 TUL. L. REV. 513,
535 n.123 (2005).
46. CONNOR, supra note 43.
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published economic studies containing 2,041 quantitative estimates of
the overcharges by hard-core cartels. The study found that the
median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all
time periods is 23 percent, the mean average is at least 49 percent,
and the median overcharges of international cartels are 38 percent,
higher than those of domestic cartels. Another 2014 study,47 which
takes into account data for the years 1990-2013, reports that in the
past four years, seventy new cartels were uncovered each year, gross
cartel overcharges exceeded USD 1.6 trillion, of which global cartels
accounted for 60 percent, and a total of nominal affected sales
reached USD 1.5 to USD 1.7 trillion. Moreover, according to an
earlier paper by Connor and Lande,48 the probability of cartel
detection was estimated between 25 percent and 30 percent and the
probability of conviction at 80 percent, so that the probability of a
cartel being detected and convicted then becomes 20 percent to 24
percent.
Interestingly, recent studies also estimate that the propensity for
cartelization in Europe, where criminal sanctions are not in place, is
roughly triple the rate per dollar of GDP that it is in North America
(United States and Canada).49 These results implicate an
undertaking's limited ability to pay for fines, a limit that is
exacerbated by the fact that the profits from cartel activity would
probably have been paid out in taxes, dividends, and salaries by the
time the fine is imposed.5 0
D. Deterrence and Calculation of Fines
In Europe, although the case law seems at least theoretically to
recognize that "both the deterrent effect and the punitive effect of the
fine are reasons why the Commission should be able to impose a
fine,"51 deterrence is considered the predominant justification of the
laws against cartels.52 The EU Fining Guidelines5 3 calculate a basic
47. JOHN M. CONNOR, THE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL CARTELS (PIC) DATA SET:
GUIDE AND SUMMARY STATISTICS, 1990-2013 (2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2478271
[https://perma.cc/62M3-3XLX] (archived Oct. 30, 2017).
48. Connor & Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy, supra note 38, at
468.
49. John M. Connor, International Cartel Stats: A Look at the Last 26 Years,
LAW360 (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.1aw360.comlarticles/827868/international-cartel-
stats-a-look-at-the-last-26-years [https://perma.cc/3MPU-PFY7] (archived Nov. 8,
2017).
50. Werden & Simon, supra note 14, at 928.
51. Case T-329/01, Archer Daniels Midland v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 11-3255,
¶ 141.
52. Werden, supra note 40; Press Release, European Commission, Antitrust
and State Aid Control-The Lessons Learned (September 24, 2009).
53. European Commission, Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines Imposed
Pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation 1/2003, 2006 O.J. (C210/02).
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minimum amount from the value of the undertaking's sales of goods
and services related to the relevant geographic market. The
proportion of the value of sales taken into account will range from 0
to 30 percent. Such a wide range of possible percentages is necessary
in order to cover different types of infringement, depending on their
gravity. Generally, for cartels, the relevant percentage tends to be in
the range of 15-20 percent.54
The proportion is then multiplied by the number of years of
participation in the violation, with an additional "entry fee" of 15 to
25 percent of the value of sales in the case of cartels. The result
obtained is the basic amount of the fine, which regulators will
increase or decrease according to aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. For deterrence purposes, the Commission may also
impose higher fines on firms that have a particularly high turnover
beyond the relevant value of sales.5 5 However, Regulation 1/2003
imposes a limit of 10 percent of total annual global turnover in order
to ensure that the fines imposed are not disproportionate to the size
of the firm. 5 6 This limitation suggests that the applicable fines on
cartels may often be below the optimal level,5 7 since the optimal
fine-the product of the activity's the harm or gain and the duration
of cartels, discounted by the probability of detection-would be
significantly above the limit of 10 percent of the annual turnover.
Looking at other jurisdictions, Canadian competition law also
recognizes deterrence as the objective of criminal fines imposed on
price-fixing conspiracies.58 Penalties for price-fixing include a
maximum fine of CAD 25 million, a maximum imprisonment of
fourteen years, or both.5 9 Canada does not have formal sentencing
guidelines for Competition Act offenses, but the general sentencing
principles can be found in the Criminal Code, in the case law, and in
the Bureau's Leniency Bulletin.60 The Leniency Bulletin contains
sentencing recommendations, which set out the criteria for
determining the amount of fines, using a proxy of 20 percent of the
cartel participant's affected volume of commerce in Canada, adjusted
to the circumstances of specific cases. The starting point for this
54. EUROPEAN COMM'N, FINES FOR BREAKING EU COMPETITION LAW (2011),
http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/cartels/overview/factsheet finesen.pdf
[https://perma.cclD2JQ-GFRZ] (archived Oct. 30, 2017).
55. Pietro Manzini, European Antitrust in Search of the Perfect Fine, 31
WORLD COMPETITION 3-17 (2008).
56. Case No. 100-3/80, Musique Diffusion Franqaise v. Comm'n, 1983 E.C.R.
1831, ¶ 118.
57. WILS, supra note 39, at 75.
58. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK ET AL., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY 756 (2002); CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU, LENIENCY
PROGRAM BULLETIN (2010), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/site/cb-
be.nsf/eng/03288.html [https://perma.cc/T9ZP-V4DE] (archived Oct. 30, 2017).
59. Competition Act, supra note 2.
60. CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU, supra note 58.
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percentage is a 10 percent estimated overcharge. However, the
Bureau considers this 10 percent often insufficient, since some
consumers are also excluded from the market as a result of higher
prices.6 1 Accordingly, the Bureau uses 20 percent of the volume of
commerce affected as a proxy of economic harm.62
Similarly, in the United States, optimal deterrence theory has
strongly influenced the guidelines for price-fixing fines.63 Criminal
penalties for violation of the Sherman Act amount to a maximum of
USD 100 million for a corporation, and USD 1 million for a natural
person, and imprisonment for a maximum of ten years. 64 The section
of the US Sentencing Commission Guidelines (USSG), which applies
to antitrust offenses, uses an estimated average gain from price-fixing
of 10 percent of the selling price as a presumption for calculating
fines for price-fixing,65 and 20 percent of the value of commerce as a
proxy for economic harm.6 6 The Guidelines also explain that the
purpose of specifying a percent of the volume of commerce is to avoid
the time and expense that would be required for a court to determine
the actual gain or loss.67
Critics consider these percentages to be arbitrary and unfair
proxies for harm, calling for the use of actual economic harm rather
than presumptions.68 The 10 percent overcharge estimate has also
been criticized for not being consistent with empirical evidence.
Interestingly, the abovementioned 2014 study by Connor69 concludes
that 79 percent of cartel overcharges have been above the USSG's 10
percent presumption, and 56 percent have been above the 20 percent
presumption. Connor and Lande also conclude that US cartel
sanctions have been only 9 percent to 21 percent as large as they
should be and that fines should be quintupled or detection rates
61. ELISA KEARNEY, THE COMPETITION BUREAU'S 20 PERCENT SOLUTION: DOES
THE PUNISHMENT FIT THE CRIME? 2 (2009).
62. Competition Bureau Submission to the OECD Global Forum on
Competition Roundtable on Sanctions in Antitrust Cases, COMPETITION BUREAU (Oct.
19, 2016), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04150.html
[https://perma.cc/NJR4-DHBR] (archived Oct. 30, 2017).
63. See Eleanor M. Fox, Cartels: A United States Story, and a Research
Program for the World, in CRIMINALIZATION OF COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT 239
(Katalin J. Cseres et al. eds., 2006); John M. Connor, Global Antitrust Prosecution of
Modern International Cartels, 4 J. INDUSTRY, COMPETITION & TRADE 239 (2004).
64. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1890).
65. U.S. GUIDELINES SENTENCING MANUAL § 2R1.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2016), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2013/manual-
pdf/2013_GuidelinesManualFull.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7GQ-CEFN] (archived Oct.
30, 2017).
66. Id. at 302.
67. Id.
68. NAT'L COMPETITION LAW SECTION, CANADIAN BAR ASS'N, DRAFT
INFORMATION BULLETIN ON SENTENCING AND LENIENCY ON CARTEL CASES (2008),
https://www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=9adccbf4-dece-4fbf-935f-
076c8al3c5ec [https://perma.cc/4DVP-4F9F] (archived Nov. 9, 2017).
69. Connor, supra note 43.
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should be increased.7 0 In light of the empirical data and the legal
limitations in the amount of imposable fines, a clear conclusion, also
supported by the OECD Competition Committee,7 1 follows. The way
fines are calculated, in practice, leads to suboptimal deterrence and
sets a level of fines that is often below the actual benefit obtained by
cartelists.
III. ANTITRUST SANCTIONS AGAINST CARTELS
This Article shares the view expressed by Canada in the OECD
roundtable, Cartels: Sanctions against individuals, that "no single
sanction is a sufficient deterrent, but it [is] important that a panoply
of sanctions is available to combat cartels. Even the threat of class
actions or civil actions can be an effective deterrent."72 This Part
discusses both corporate and individual liability. It discusses the
sanctions that can be imposed on corporations and/or individuals,
ranging from monetary fines to imprisonment, and recognizes the
virtues of combining public enforcement with a more central role for
private actions. It then explains why some form of individual liability
may be necessary to ensure cartel deterrence.
A. Corporate Liability
Historically, corporate liability found a more fertile field in
common law jurisdictions, in part influenced by earlier industrial
development, than in civil law countries.
There are different attribution rules to identify conduct of
individuals that can be regarded as acts of the collective entity. In
particular, the literature identifies various approaches for corporate
criminal liability in common law jurisdictions, most importantly the
"identification principle" and "vicarious liability."7 3 According to the
1972 English case Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass74 regarding
the responsibility of a shop manager for selling advertised discounted
products at a higher price, the founding case for the identification
theory, the actor must be capable of being identified as the "directing
70. Connor & Lande, Cartels as Rational Business Strategy, supra note 38, at
428.
71. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV. COMPETITION COMMITTEE,
CARTELS: SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIVMUALS (2005), http://www.oecd.org/competition/
cartels/34306028.pdf [https://perma.cclRYH2-9UKV] (archived Oct. 30, 2017)
[hereinafter OECD, CARTELS: SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS].
72. Id. at 105.
73. BRUCE WARDHAUGH, CARTELS, MARKETS AND CRIME: A NORMATIVE
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CRIMINALISATION OF ECONOMIC COLLUSION 52-87 (Cambridge
U. Press 2014).
74. Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1971] UKHL 31, [1971] 2 WLR 1166
(appeal taken from Eng.).
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mind" of the company, irrespective of the gravity of the offense.7 5
Since corporations can only act through their employees and agents, a
company can be guilty of a crime only if its "directing mind"
committed the prohibited act to benefit the corporation, by having the
necessary state of mind and by having the authority to set policies
rather than simply manage, so that the person can be considered the
alter ego or "soul" of the corporation.
Vicarious liability, instead, provides a broader test for
identifying individual behavior that may bind the corporation, based
on employees' actions within the scope of their employment, in
accordance with the principle of respondeat superior. Vicarious
liability is the standard adopted in the United States.7 6 Under this
test, any person within the corporation, regardless of his or her
position, and therefore beyond those at the top of the corporate
hierarchy, may trigger corporate liability when he or she intends to
benefit the organization, even when the corporation explicitly forbids
their action.7
Historically, Canada based corporate criminal liability on the
identification doctrine. The Canadian Supreme Court developed its
"directing mind" test in Canadian Dredge & Dock, Co. v. The Queen,7 8
which involved bid rigging in the context of tenders for dredging
operations. In that decision, the Court held that the directing mind is
any person exercising "the governing executive authority of the
corporation," acting within the assigned field of operation, and with
the purpose of benefitting the company.7 9 The Court then restrictively
interpreted the concept of "governing executive authority" in Rh6ne v.
The Peter AB Widener as requiring "an express or implied delegation
of executive authority to design and supervise the implementation of
corporate policy rather than simply to carry out such policy."8 0
Then, in 2004, Section 22.2 of the Canadian Criminal Code came
into force and broadened the scope of corporate liability.8 1 According
to this new section, corporations may be criminally responsible for
fault-based offenses, including criminal conspiracy under Section 45
of the Canadian Competition Act, when three conditions are met:
(i) a "senior officer" had the intent, at least in part, to benefit the corporation;
75. In that decision, it was concluded that the shop manager's mind could not
be identified with the company Tesco, on the basis that a shop manager was too low in
Tesco's corporate hierarchy for his or her actions to be attributed to the company.
76. See New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, 212
U.S. 481 (1909).
77. WARDHAUGH, supra note 73, at 71
78. Canadian Dredge & Dock Co. v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 662 (Can.).
79. Id. at 668.
80. The Rh6ne v. The Peter A.B. Widener, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 497 (Can.).
81. An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Criminal Liability of Organizations),
R.S.C. 2003, c. 21 (Can.).
2018] 15
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
(ii) the senior officer, acting within the scope of his or her authority, was a
party to the offense; and,
(iii) the senior officer had the required mens rea, was acting within the scope of
his or her authority, and directed the work of other representatives, including
employees, agents, or contractors of the corporation to perform the actus reus of
the offense; or knowing that a representative of the corporation is or is about to
be a party to the offense, the senior officer fails to take all reasonable measures
to stop her from being a party to the offense.8 2
"Senior officer" is defined in Section 2 of the Criminal Code and is not
limited to individuals appointed by the board of directors.
Specifically, a senior officer is a director, chief executive officer, chief
financial officer, partner, employee, member, agent, or contractor
"who plays an important role in the establishment of a corporation's
policies or is responsible for managing an important aspect of the
corporation's activities."83
In the 2013 antitrust case R v Les PMtroles Global Inc, three
employees of a retail gasoline station were charged under the
criminal conspiracy provision in Section 45(1)(c) of the Competition
Act for conspiring to prevent or restrict competition in the sale of
retail gasoline in two Quebec markets.84 By abandoning the
dichotomy between employees designing and supervising the
implementation of corporate policy and those who simply carry out
such policy, the Court's interpretation of Section 22.2 seems to extend
the scope of criminal corporate responsibility down to those who
operationalize and implement corporate policies set by others.8 5 Such
expansion of responsibility is particularly significant in the context of
cartel offenses.
In contrast to common law jurisdictions, civil law regimes have
been more reluctant to recognize criminal liability of corporations,
mostly on the grounds of the Roman-Germanic principle societas
delinquere et puniri non potest. Criminal liability of legal entities, for
example, is unknown under German criminal law.86 Nevertheless,
many European countries have now introduced some form of
corporate liability, often in the form of administrative offenses. At the
European level, there is no harmonized criminal corporate liability
and no competency to impose criminal penalties either on
corporations or individuals involved in price-fixing activities. The
conduct of employees, directors, and officers that infringes
competition law can result only in administrative fines for the
82. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c C-46, § 22.2.
83. Id. § 2.
84. R. v. Les P6troles Global, Inc., 2013 Q.C.C.S. 4262 (Can.).
85. Id. ¶¶ 42, 185.
86. See Edward B. Diskant, Comparative Corporate Criminal Liability:
Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure,
118 YALE L. J. 126, 142 (2008).
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undertaking imposed by the European Commission according to
Regulation 1/2003.87 The Commission's anxiety to deter cartels with
the imposition of costly fines clearly emerges from statistical reports.
Fines imposed by the European Commission8 8 increased from EUR
539,691,550 between 1990 and 1994 to EUR 8,930,678,674 between
2010 and 2014. Breaking down this second timeframe, fines almost
tripled between 2011 (EUR 614,053,000) and 2014 (EUR
1,689,497,000).89
There are potentially other available sanctions that may be
imposed on corporations, including disqualification from bidding on
public contracts if a corporation is convicted of conspiracy or bid
rigging and adverse publicity orders. Both measures may have a
powerful effect in discouraging collusive practices, not only by causing
a negative direct financial effect but also by having an impact on non-
financial dimensions such as corporate prestige and future
employment prospects of managers.9 0
Corporations may also face civil liability from private
enforcement9 ' and class actions.92 In the United States, private
litigation is the predominant mode of enforcing antitrust laws. Recent
studies show a 10:1 ratio of private/public enforcement.9 3 In 1977, the
ratio was even greater than 20:1.94 To ensure that private parties
have an adequate economic incentive to undertake antitrust
litigation, US federal laws authorize the award of treble damages and
attorneys' fees.95
The experience in Canada and Europe is somewhat different. In
Canada, the level of private enforcement activity remains low, even
after the introduction of Section 36 for private damages in the
87. ALISON JONES & BRENDA SUFRIN, EU COMPETITION LAW 994 (2014).
88. Amount not adjusted for changes after court judgements.
89. EUROPEAN COMM'N, CARTEL STATISTICS (2017),
http://ec.europa.eulcompetition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf [https://perma.ccUY5C-
DDP5] (archived Nov. 9, 2017). The highest fine for a cartel in Europe (to date) was
imposed on a TV and computer monitor tubes cartel in 2012 and totalled
C1,470,515,000 and the highest fine imposed on an individual corporation was C
715,000,000 in 2008 to a company operating in the car glass sector. Id.
90. BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON
CORPORATE OFFENDERS 34-35 (1983).
91. Kent Roach & Michael J. Trebilcock, Private Enforcement of Competition
Laws, 34 OSGOODE HALL L. J. 461, 508 (1996).
92. See generally Margaret Sanderson & Michael J. Trebilcock, Competition
Class Actions: An Evaluation of Deterrence and Corrective Justice Rationales, in
LITIGATING CONSPIRACY, AN ANALYSIS OF COMPETITION CLASS ACTIONS 81 (Stephen
G.A. Pitel ed., 2006).
93. Daniel Crane, Technology and Antitrust, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1159, 1179 (2008).
94. Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private
Antitrust Litigation, 74 GEO. L. J. 1001, 1002 (1986).
95. Bill Baer, Assistant Attorney Gen., Anti-Trust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
Remarks as Prepared for Delivery to European Competition Forum 2014 (2014),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/517756/download [https://perma.cc/Y3L5-WDSK]
(archived Oct. 30, 2017).
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Competition Act in 1976. Similarly, competition law in Europe has
been dominated primarily by public enforcement. However, some
measures have been taken recently in order to promote private
enforcement, most notably the EU Damages Directive signed into law
in November 2014, which includes both direct and indirect
purchasers as victims of antitrust infringements96 and represents a
positive development in antitrust enforcement.97
The relationship between private and public enforcement of
competition law has been widely debated in the law and economics
literature.9 8 Starting from the work of Becker and Stigler,9 9 followed
by Landes and Posneroo and subsequently by Polinsky,1 0 law and
economic scholars have highlighted the complementary role of private
and public enforcement, while also recognizing potential risks of over-
enforcement from private individuals' uncoordinated attempts to
deter undesirable behavior.1 02
There are many advantages to private enforcement. Firstly,
private enforcement fulfills corrective justice rationales. Secondly,
private plaintiffs often have more information than public officials
and stronger incentives to enforce public laws affecting their
interests. Further, private enforcement can also compensate for the
weaknesses of public enforcement and enhance public
accountability.103 Moreover, private enforcement has a strong
deterrent role because it increases the probability of detection and the
costs of illegal activities.104
In relation to deterrence, the question is how to modify fines to
account for the private-public enforcement duality. The optimal
sanction is the product of the amount of the fine and probability of
detection. However, with private enforcement, these two variables
cannot be set independently: if a high sanction is associated with low
probability of enforcement, it may encourage excessive enforcement
activity by private parties motivated to capture fines or damages.
This would increase the probability of detection beyond socially
96. Council Directive 14/014, 2014 O.J. (L349/1),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/damages-directive-final-en.p
df [https://perma.cc/6E76-6MM9] (archived Oct. 30, 2017).
97. For an analysis of the EU reform package to encourage private
enforcement, see Alison Jones, Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: A
Comparison with, and Lessons from, the US, in HARMONISING EU COMPETITION
LITIGATION: THE NEW DIRECTIVE AND BEYOND 15 (Bergstrbm et al. eds., 2016).
98. Roach & Trebilcock, supra note 91, at 475.
99. See generally Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law, Enforcement,
Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
100. See generally William Landes & Richard Posner, The Private Enforcement
of Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1975).
101. See generally Mitchell A. Polinski, Private Versus Public Enforcement of
Fines, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1980).
102. See, e.g., Landes and Posner, supra note 100.
103. Roach & Trebilcock, supra note 91, at 482-83.
104. Sanderson & Trebilcock, supra note 92, at 18.
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optimal levels and result in over-enforcement.0 5 On the contrary,
with only public enforcement in place, resources can be fixed at a
constant level. With a mixed and uncoordinated system of public and
private enforcement, setting the sanction and probability of detection
in a systematic way is therefore extremely complex.106
In addition, the availability of class actions may exacerbate the
ex ante unpredictability of penalties. Class actions are not currently
available in the European regime, but any reform in that direction
would necessarily entail an analysis of coordination with public
enforcement and the effects on the probability of detection and the
amount of the total penalty. Although the deterrent role of private
enforcement is partially limited by the same problem of "inability to
pay," its importance for deterrence cannot be overstated. For
instance, in their study on the role of private enforcement, Lande and
Davis argue that private actions enabled deterrence of
anticompetitive behavior in the United States more effectively than
criminal cartel proceedings.0 7 Within the current system of
enforcement, enhancing the role of private actions and fostering
harmonization at the European level appears to be a priority for
European antitrust enforcement.
In conclusion, this subpart outlined the sanctions that may be
imposed on corporations and the complementary role of civil liability
and private enforcement. Both monetary and non-monetary penalties
imposed on corporations play an important role in ensuring
deterrence. Private enforcement and class actions, as well, are useful
complementary mechanisms for the same purpose. At the same time,
while recognizing those benefits, it appears that focusing exclusively
on a corporate level does not enable a satisfactory resolution of many
of the issues related to deterring cartels, which may require the
complementary role of individual responsibility.
B. Sanctions on Individuals
One important starting point in regard to individual actors'
liability is to recognize that there are both behavioral and
organizational aspects of cartel activity that necessarily require joint
liability of individual and corporate action.108 The argument in favor
of individual liability is supported by the recognition that a regime
lacking individual sanctions inevitably faces a number of problems
105. Roach & Trebilcock, supra note 91, at 493.
106. See generally WARREN SCHWARTZ, THE PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
ANTITRUST LAWS: AN ECONOMIC CRITIQUE (1981).
107. See generally Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence
from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Law, 2011
BYU L. REV. 315 (2011).
108. CHRISTOPHER HARDING & JULIAN JOSHUA, REGULATING CARTELS IN
EUROPE 258-65 (2nd ed. 2011).
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that, when taken into serious consideration, may justify individual
liability on at least four grounds:
(i) Inability to pay. In its third report on hard-core cartels, the
OECD adopted the position 0 9 that corporate sanctions in
the form of fines are almost never sufficiently high to be an
optimal deterrent, and the threat of individual sanctions
can be an important complement to corporate financial
sanctions. As already mentioned, fines cannot be raised ad
infinitum, because at some point corporations are unable to
pay the amount of fines required to secure optimal or
absolute deterrence. The alternative of bankruptcy would
certainly be undesirable, creating high social costs and
problems for the competitive process itself. Some form of
complementary individual liability would overcome the
problem of firms' inability to pay. In relation to criminal
sanctions, some scholars recognize that even though
increasing a fine to achieve optimal deterrence would cost
less than imprisonment, imprisonment may be imposed as
a last resort when the company and the individual are
unable to pay the optimal fine.11 0
(ii) Principal-agent problem. The lack of sanctions on
individuals does not solve the principal-agent problem
inherent in cartel offenses, and it does not enable
companies to discipline employees' behavior effectively.
This agency problem emerges where the managers and the
individuals involved in a cartel are able to externalize the
cost of the penalty, because the fine applies not to them
individually but exclusively to the company. Therefore,
when individuals are not accountable under the law, the
risk is that the benefits of a cartel activity may accrue to
both shareholders and managers, but managers may
ultimately escape liability. Moreover, corporations may also
be willing to incentivize cartel activity when the expected
benefits outweigh the costs, and then be ready to
compensate employees for their action.11 1 Such a
mechanism becomes less likely to succeed if individual
cartelists are personally civilly or criminally liable. As
reported by a corporate executive, "as long as you are only
talking about money, the company can at the end of the day
109. OECD, CARTELS: SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS, supra note 71, at 7.
110. See Richard Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 409, 413 (1980).
1l1. See generally Connor & Lande, How High Do Cartels Raise Prices?, supra
note 45, at 516.
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take care of me . . . but once you begin talking about taking
away my liberty, there is nothing that the company can do
for me."112
(iii) Stronger moral stigma. Sanctions on individuals entail a
stronger social condemnation and work on the level of
individuals' moral commitment to obey the law, which is
felt less stringently at a corporate level.113 Accordingly, by
not holding individuals responsible, the moral force that
could enhance deterrence is weaker. Criminal liability is a
particularly strong deterrent,114 especially for individuals
involved in antitrust illegal activities and white-collar
crimes.
(iv) Incentives to cooperation and leniency programs. The game
theoretic prisoner's dilemma introduced by leniency
programs is enhanced by the presence of individual
sanctions. When individuals do not face the risk of being
held liable, they may not have sufficient incentives to
reveal evidence about cartels and cooperate with the
competition authorities. The possibility of avoiding
individual sanctions provides the necessary incentive for
individuals to "blow the whistle" and offer cooperation in
exchange for immunity or a reduced penalty. In this way,
leniency programs increase the probability of detection and
effectively destabilize cartels. Therefore, the combination of
individual liability and leniency programs positively deters
cartel behavior.1 15
Sanctions imposed on individuals may include, for example,
individuals' disqualification from acting as directors of a company for
a specific time, penal fines, and imprisonment. Disqualification
orders, such as those existing under the UK Enterprise Act 2002,116
may be an appealing option at the EU level, because they require
fewer costs of implementation and enforcement, and they are more
likely to obtain the necessary political support. It may still be
possible, however, that even in this case, the corporation may find a
112. Baker, Use of Criminal Law Remedies, supra note 18, at 705.
113. WHELAN, supra note 16, at 51.
114. Donald I. Baker & Barbara A. Reeves, The Paper Label Sentences:
Critique, 86 YALE L. J. 619, 621 (1977).
115. OECD, CARTELS: SANCTIONS AGAINST INDIVIDUALS, supra note 71, at 8; see
generally Jeroen Hinloopen & Adriaan R. Soetevent, Laboratory Evidence on the
Effectiveness of Corporate Leniency Programs, 39 RAND J. ECON. 607 (2008); Nathan H.
Miller, Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 750 (2009).
116. See generally Enterprise Act 2002, c. 40 (Eng.).
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way to compensate the employees, who could still retain some
indirect influence in the decision-making process.
An individual cartelist could also be required to pay a penal fine.
Despite recognizing that companies could still find a mechanism to
indemnify and compensate employees, the risk of being individually
liable to pay criminal fines represents a very strong deterrent, both in
terms of financial consequences and stigma associated with being
criminally convicted as an individual.
The strongest deterrent against cartels is imprisonment. Many
law and economics commentators, relying on the conclusions drawn
from Becker's model, rejected the idea that such criminal sanctions
should be imposed on individuals for antitrust infringements.17 As
the argument goes, the imposition of fines imposes little cost
compared to imprisonment, and their amount is easier to compute."8
Moreover, other reasons for excluding individual liability are based
on the fact that the corporation theoretically has the tools needed to
force and correct the behavior of employees, through mechanisms
such as corporate compliance, and that it would be very difficult to
identify the individual liability of each person involved in a cartel.
However, as other authors have argued,11 9 in the context of
hard-core cartels this conclusion may have some limitations,
including corporations' inability to pay very high fines. Further, the
fact that offenses like price fixing are always harmful to society
suggests they should be completely eliminated rather than optimally
deterred.120 The gravity of cartel offenses is confirmed by the
adoption across jurisdictions of per se rules and by an overall
consensus among antitrust scholars that hard-core conspiracies
almost never benefit society.121 This view is shared even among
generally non-interventionist "Chicago school" commentators.122
Those that argue in favor of imprisonment usually also suggest
that the stigma associated with criminal imprisonment is arguably
high no matter how long an individual is sentenced and that the
marginal cost to society for additional incarceration increases.
Therefore, they conclude that short imprisonment terms may be the
adequate policy prescription.123 The Canadian and American
antitrust regimes currently can impose imprisonment of fourteen and
ten years, respectively.
117. Becker, supra note 14, at 43-45.
118. Werden & Simon, supra note 14, at 922.
119. Id. at 934-37.
120. Id. at 933-34. This position is in line with absolute deterrence or with the
'gain to the offender' approach.
121. See generally Presley L. Warner & Michael J. Trebilcock, Rethinking Price-
Fixing Law, 38 McGiLL L. J. 680 (1993).
122. RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 4 (2d ed. 2001); see ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 429 (2d ed. 1993).
123. Werden & Simon, supra note 14, at 937.
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In Canada, the imposition of jail sentences has been rare.124 For
instance, eleven individuals were sentenced for participating in
cartels between 1998 and 2008, but only two were sentenced to prison
and the remaining nine were only required to pay fines.1 25 On the
contrary, in the United States, twenty-one individuals were
sentenced to serve time in jail for cartel offences in 2014 (fiscal year).
The average number of individuals sent to prison each year and the
average length of sentences respectively increased during the years
from thirteen individuals and eight month sentences (1990-1999) to
twenty-nine individuals and twenty-five month sentences (2010-
2014).126 The number of individuals sentenced to prison rose during
those periods from 37 percent (1990-1999) to 70 percent (2010-
2013).127 A significant number of European member states also
adopted criminal sanctions for some competition law infringements at
the national level.128 Many US commentators argue that the most
effective deterrent for hard-core cartel activity is prison sentences,
and that the use of criminal law against individual cartelists has
been one of the most successful and important features of US
antitrust enforcement.12 9
The introduction of jail sentences for cartelists is a complex issue
for criminal policy-making, as the individual and social costs
associated with incarceration and risks of type I errors are extremely
high. Jail sentences for individuals involved in price fixing and bid
rigging must necessarily follow from a socially accepted view of the
moral wrongfulness of such collusive practices and from a general
acceptance of their criminal nature. Arguing for imprisonment solely
on the basis of deterrence in a social context where the phenomenon
of cartels is seen as morally neutral contains high risks of de-
legitimizing criminal law, undermining not only its ability to provide
an effective deterrent but also its moral-signaling function.13 0
Therefore, imprisonment may be introduced only if there is a socially
accepted idea that cartel activity is a serious criminal behavior
124. See CAN. COMPETITION BUREAU, PENALTIES IMPOSED BY THE COURTS
(2017), http://www.competitionbureau.gc.caleic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/01863.html
[https://perma.cc/43JS-ALR7] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
125. ELISA KEARNEY & MARK KATz, ANTI-CARTEL ENFORCEMENT IN CANADA -
STILL MORE BARK THAN BITE 5 (2009).
126. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL PROGRAM UPDATE 2015: DIVISION
UPDATE SPRING 2015, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2015/criminal-
program-update (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.ccIW3H7-XT7J] (archived
Oct. 23, 2017).
127. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL PROGRAM UPDATE 2014: DIVISloN
UPDATE SPRING 2014, https://www.justice.gov/atr/division-update/2014/criminal-
program (last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/XVS4-V58Y] (archived Oct. 23,
2017).
128. See Peter Whelan, Criminal Sanction: An Overview of EU and National
Case Law, E-COMPETITIONS 1, 1 (2012).
129. Baker, Use of Criminal Law Remedies, supra note 18, at 713.
130. Jones & Williams, supra note 19, at 16-18.
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deserving such punishment. In any event, where adopted,
imprisonment should be limited to extreme cases and used as only a
last resort sanction. Deterrence alternatively may be served by
increasing the probability of detection with a more prominent role for
private actions, rather than the level of punishment. '3i
Concluding, the goal of this subpart was to show the importance
of disincentives that work on the level of individual responsibility.
Reviewing some empirical studies conducted by Connor,132 it seems to
emerge that almost half of the sampled cartels operated exclusively in
Europe, that roughly two-thirds of all international cartels fixed
prices in Western Europe, and that, by contrast, only 12 percent of all
international cartels operated exclusively in North America, and
global cartels with North American operations increased the
percentage to 25 percent.i3 3 As a result, Connor concludes that the
propensity for cartelization in Europe is roughly triple the rate per
dollar of GDP than it is in North America. If these data suggest any
correlation with the different sanction mechanisms available on the
two sides of the Atlantic, jurisdictions like the European Union must
face the reality that high monetary fines on corporations are not in
themselves an adequate instrument of enforcement and that it may
be time to seek alternative solutions to the problem of cartel
deterrence.
C. In Search of an Optimal Regime
The trade-off between increasing fines to a level that would
make companies exit the market-raising serious concerns for the
competitive process-and the problem of under-deterrencel34 requires
any competition law regime preoccupied with deterring cartel activity
to adopt a mix of sanctions that go beyond monetary fines at the level
of the corporation. This has important implications for the current
sanction and enforcement model adopted by jurisdictions like the
European Union, which appears to lack a systematic analysis of the
choice of available sanctions and a fine-tuning between public and
private enforcement. In the light of this analysis, two major
improvements appear necessary. First, the major shortfall of the
current sanction regime is arguably the lack of sanctions on
individuals participating in cartels. This is not to underplay the role
of corporate sanctions.3 5 On the contrary, corporate sanctions give
corporations appropriate incentives to monitor employees' behavior
131. Becker, supra note 14, at 35.
132. See generally Connor, supra note 47.
133. Id. at 22.
134. JONATHAN FAULL & ALI NIKPAY, THE EC LAW OF COMPETITION 4, 5 (2d ed.
2007).
135. Fisse, supra note 16, at 1234-43.
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and provide in themselves a strong, although insufficient, deterrent
effect. But deterrence must necessarily act both at the corporate and
individual level in order to be effective. Second, deterrence may be
positively enhanced through a better calibration between public and
private enforcement. As already mentioned, the role of private
enforcement, a quintessential element of US antitrust law, has
increased under European competition law, and efforts to expand its
role are welcome. In particular,, by increasing the probability of
detection, private enforcement can mitigate some of the issues related
to companies' inability to pay and need to resort to criminal
sanctions.
The idea of introducing criminal sanctions has strong theoretical
justifications, but if accepted, it would require taking into account
some important caveats. While it has been explained that
criminalization of cartel activity may be advantageous from a
deterrence perspective, implementing such policy reform would
require evaluating many other legal and cultural factors, including
the role of criminal law, the general perception of antitrust rules, and
the receptiveness to such reform in the implementing environment.136
This may be one of the biggest obstacles to introducing antitrust
criminal responsibility at the European level, where there has been a
long history of skepticism of both corporate criminal liability and the
imposition of criminal sanction on individuals involved in antitrust
offenses. Further, effective introduction of criminal sanctions would
require a careful drafting of the definition of the offense, to narrow it
exclusively to hard-core cartel activity. Moreover, it is also important
to note that, before making any prescriptive claim, the alleged
deterrent effects must be supported by more robust empirical
evidence on the deterrent effects of criminalization and on the impact
of each type of sanction. Finally, and most importantly for the Part
that follows, the costs and benefits involved in switching to a criminal
law system of enforcement, compared to an administrative one, must
be taken into account.
IV. CRIMINALIZATION, DUE PROCESS, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
The institutional aspect of antitrust criminalization presents a
two-fold dimension. Firstly, it must be considered whether non-
criminal monetary fines comply with an administrative law
classification and whether their nature is de facto criminal. Secondly,
the potential implications for the re-design of competition law
institutions arising from either the de facto criminal law character of
136. See generally Ariel Ezrachi & Jiei Kindl, Criminalization of Cartel Activity
- A Desirable Goal for India's Competition Regime, 23 NAT'L L. SCH. INDIA REV. 9
(2011).
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monetary fines or the introduction of other criminal sanctions for
deterrent purposes will require further scrutiny. An administrative
integrated agency model certainly would not be adequate to comply
with due process criminal law requirements, and a separation of
investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions would become
a necessary policy reform. This will entail a contextualized analysis of
the various trade-offs associated with different institutional
models.1 3 7 The next subpart explores the first institutional dimension
by looking comparatively at the nature of antitrust fines under the
ECHR case law in the European Union and at the constitutionality of
administrative monetary penalties in Canada.
A. De Facto Criminal Fines
1. The ECHR's "Composite Approach" to Article 6
As explained in the previous Part, the European Commission's
fining powers are not criminal according to EU law.1 3 8 Article 23(5) of
Regulation 1/2003 expressly states that fines imposed on
undertakings and associations of undertakings for violation of Article
101 or 102 TFEU shall not be of a criminal law nature.1 39 Antitrust
fines, however, may be considered criminal for the purposes of the
European Convention on Human Rights. The European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg opted for a sui generis conception of
"criminal,"140 which is determined according to three parameters
often referred to as the Engel criteria,141 namely: (i) the classification
of the offense under domestic law, (ii) the nature of the offense, and
(iii) the severity of the penalty. These criteria are not cumulative.142
The Court usually considers the first criterion only as a starting
point, and therefore it is not determinative.1 43 Within the second and
third criteria, the Court considers various factors, most importantly,
whether the norm is only addressed to a specific group or is of a
generally binding character, whether the level of the sanction and the
stigma attaching to the offense is important, and whether the
137. Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 12, at 457-64.
138. Case T-276/04, Compagnie Maritime Belge SA v. Comm'n, 4 C.M.L.R. 21,
995 (2008); Cimen Case C-338/00, Volkswagen v. Comm'n, 2003 E.C.R. 1-9189, T 96;
Case T-25/95, Cimenteries CBR SA v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. 11-508. On this basis, in
Compagnie Maritime Belge, the General Court confirmed that antitrust fines were not
of a criminal nature, as deciding otherwise would "infringe seriously on the effectiveness
of Community competition law."
139. Council Regulation 1/03/EC, supra note 5.
140. See Deweer v. Belgium, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 169, 187-90 (1980).
141. Engel & Others v. the Netherlands, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 3, 1 82
(1976).
142. Ezeh & Connors v. United Kingdom, 9 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 86 (2003).
143. Oztfirk v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No. 8544/79, 6 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 409, ¶ 52 (1984).
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sanctions imposed are not merely compensatory but truly punitive
and meant to have a deterrent effect.14 4 Antitrust fines have been
considered "criminal" within the specific meaning of the ECHR,14 5
based on the stigma and punitive and eterrent elements associated
with them.
In particular, after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in
2009, which provided for the future accession of the European Union
to the ECHR, many commentators feared that the current
combination of investigational, prosecutorial, and adjudicative powers
within the European Commission would be incompatible with the due
process requirement enshrined in Article 6 ECHR, which reads: "In
the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law." 14 6 Nevertheless, the ECtHR so far has decided to
save the current administrative law model1 47 by making a distinction
between "hard-core" criminal law and "minor criminal offenses" and
by placing competition law infringements in the latter category.148
Relying on this distinction, the ECtHR concluded that an
administrative law system of enforcement is compatible with Article
6(1) ECHR-despite the "independent and impartial tribunal"
requirement-insofar as (i) the administrative proceeding is governed
by sufficiently strong procedural guarantees (such as division of tasks
and functions within the Directorate-General for Competition (DG
Competition), and the appointment of impartial officers supervising
the fairness of the procedure), and (ii) decisions are then capable of
being challenged by a judicial body with "full jurisdiction" to review
the administrative decision.149
This approach was adopted in Le Compte v. Belgium,15 0 in which
it was clarified that the Convention requires at least one of the
following systems: "either the jurisdictional organs themselves
comply with the requirements of Article 6, paragraph 1, or they do
not so comply but are subject to subsequent control by a judicial body
144. Bendenoun v. France, 284 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1 47 (1994).
145. A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L v. Italy, No. 43509/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1
(2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-106438
[https:/perma.cc/3UNP-KKSS] (archived Nov. 7, 2017); Case T-1/89, Rh6ne-Poulenc v.
Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 11-869, 885; Ozttirk, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 409, ¶ 52.
146. EuR. CT. OF HUM. RTS., GUIDE ON ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION - RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL 6 (2017), http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide-Art_6_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cclNH2M-KGAF] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
147. Jussila v. Finland, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R. 996, T 43 (2006).
148. Id.
149. See generally Arianna Andreangeli, Toward an EU Competition Court:
Article-6-Proofing Antitrust Proceedings before the Commission?, 30 WORLD
COMPETITION 595, 609 (2007).
150. Le Compte, Van Leuven & De Meyere v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 22
(1983).
2018J] 27
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
that has full jurisdiction and does not deprive the guarantees of
Article 6." Such a "composite approach"15 1 reflects the distinction
between "hard-core" criminal offenses-for which the right to a
hearing before an independent ribunal is required at first instance-
and minor criminal offenses-which require a less stringent
approach.1 5 2 In the same judgment, the ECtHR held that "demands
of flexibility and efficiency, which are fully compatible with the
protection of human rights, may justify the prior intervention of
administrative or professional bodies and, a fortiori, of judicial bodies
which do not satisfy the said requirements in every respect."153
According to this case law, therefore, even though the
Commission combines investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative
functions, and it cannot be qualified as an independent and impartial
tribunal, the current system is not incompatible with Article 6(1)
ECHR,154 provided that adequate checks and balances within the
Commission are in place and that it is possible to subsequently
submit the competition authority's decision to full judicial review.1 55
In order to comply with those conditions, the Commission adopted
various mechanisms to reduce the risks of prosecutorial bias; for
example, the introduction of a peer panel review, where DG
Competition panels and Legal Service officials independently oversee
draft decisions,156 and an enhancement of the roles of the Hearing
Officer,157 the European Ombudsman,158 and the Chief Competition
Economist,15 9 all of- which increased the level of fairness in the
procedure. Moreover, although many doubts have been raised about
the compatibility of judicial review under Article 263 TFEU with the
requirements of "full jurisdiction"-in particular, whether or not that
151. Andreangeli, supra note 149, at 609.
152. Id.
153. Le Compte, Van Leuven & De Meyere v. Belgium, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
¶ 51 (1981).
154. For a critique, see Donald Slater, S6bastien Thomas & Denis Waelbroeck,
Competition Law Proceedings Before The European Commission And The Right To A
Fair Trial: No Need For Reform?, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 97, 139-40 (2008).
155 Le Compte, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 51.
156. Forrester, supra note 8, at 823.
157. The function of the Hearing Officer (HO) is to supervise the objectivity,
transparency, and efficiency of the proceedings and therefore ensure that the right of
defence is respected. Id. at 836.
158. The European Ombudsman is an independent office created by the
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 in order to guarantee good administration and receive
complaint for maladministration. Complaint to the European Ombudsman, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/justice/citizen/complaints/ombudsman/index-en.htm
(last visited Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/98WB-4HFL] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
159. In 2003, the European Commission announced the appointment of a Chief
Competition Economist and an office composed of ten specialized economists. LARS-
HENDRIK ROLLER & PIERRE A. BUIGUES, THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COMPETITION
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would entail an appeal on the merit and the power to adopt a de novo
decision-the 2012 decisions Menarini Diagnostics stl v. Italyl60 by
the Strasbourg Court and KME Germany AG, et. al. v. Commission61
and Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v. Europena Commissionl62
by the Luxembourg Court seem to put an end to this debate, at least
for the time being, by confirming that judicial review by the EU
courts pursuant to Article 263 TFEU can be considered compatible
with Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights, as long as the EU courts are able to quash, on
questions of law and facts, the challenged decision, leaving open the
possibility of remitting the issue for redetermination by the same
administrative body.163
Three major observations can be made about this case law on the
nature of monetary fines. First, the institutional solution adopted by
the ECtHR to deal with de facto criminal nature of fines does not
eliminate the risk of prosecutorial bias within an administrative
authority in which all investigative, enforcement, and adjudicative
tasks are concentrated. A case handler will naturally tend to have a
bias in favor of finding a violation once proceedings have commenced,
despite the checks and balances that have been put in place. The
increasing importance of fundamental rights and the perceived need
for higher guarantees in antitrust proceedings post-Lisbon seems to
suggest that the future developments of competition law enforcement
will not require simply formal compliance with due process standards
but an intent to reach higher thresholds of protection from a de iure
condendo normative prospective. In this light, it remains a concern
that the same administrative body is in charge of investigative,
prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions.164 In addition, the condition
of full jurisdiction is arguably not always respected along the
spectrum of competition law cases. In particular, the European courts
often adopt a deferential approach toward the Commission's analysis
of "complex economic assessments.",'6  This margin of appreciation
recognized by the EU courts results in a limited review of manifest
errors committed by the Commission in the appraisal of complex
economic issues. Despite the apparent awareness that "the Courts
cannot use the Commission's margin of discretion . . . as a basis for
160. A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L v. Italy, No. 43509/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2011),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-106438
[https://perma.cc/3UNP-KKSS] (archived Nov. 7, 2017).
161. Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany AG v. Comm'n, 2011 E.C.R. 1-0000, 4
C.M.L.R. 8, ¶T 91-94 (2011).
162. Case C-386/10 P, Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v. Comm'n, 2011
E.C.R. 1-13085, TT 50-54 (2011).
163. Janosevic v. Sweden, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 26, 1 81.
164. OECD, EUROPEAN COMMISSION - PEER REVIEW OF COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 63-64 (2005), http://www.oecd.org/eul35908641.pdf [https://perma.cc/PS7A-
PM67] (archived Oct. 31, 2017).
165. Slater, Thomas & Waelbroeck, supra, note 154.
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dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of
the facts,"1 66 such a deferential approach is detectable in many
decisions.16 7
Second, although the ECHR case law recognizes the criminal
nature of antitrust fines, it saves the administrative model on the
basis of the distinction between "hard-core" and "minor criminal
offenses," which does not seem to be justified on sufficiently clear and
robust theoretical grounds. In particular, classifying the whole of
competition law as minor offenses does not appropriately rank and
distinguish between hard-core cartels and less problematic behaviors
such as unilateral abuses and vertical restraints, which in all major
jurisdictions are subject to different legal tests, respectively per se
rules and rule of reason (or their equivalents). This appears in stark
contrast with the US acceptance and public willingness "to treat
individuals who participate in cartels as serious criminals who should
be treated in the same way as embezzlers, stock swindlers and other
economic thieves."168
Third, the methods used to calculate fines may reveal punitive
elements that may belong to criminal law. The European Fining
Guidelines for example, indicate that for cartels there is an entry fee
of 15-25 percent of the volume of sales to be added to the calculation
of the basic amount.169 This may be seen as a mechanism to enhance
deterrence, but also as a way to punish cartelists for engaging in such
activity. Further, some of the aggravating circumstances, such as the
mark-up for recidivists, are not per se economically justified or related
to the harm or illegal gain attributable to the cartel activity. It may
be asked whether introducing entry fees or aggravating elements that
increase the level of fines without any direct link to the harm or gain
arising from a cartel activity is dictated by some retributive
considerations. In fact, as already mentioned, the EU courts
themselves recognize that "both the deterrent effect and the punitive
effect of the fine are reasons why the Commission should be able to
impose a fine."170 Those elements seem to have affinity with criminal
law parlance and they fit within a retributive theory of criminal
liability.
In conclusion, the status quo remains vulnerable to criticism on
many levels. In the light of these considerations, the legal solution
adopted by the ECtHR in relation to the shortcomings of the current
administrative model seems more a temporary compromise-
determined by the various legal, institutional, and political obstacles
166. Chalkor, 2011 E.C.R. ¶ 62.
167. Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3619, 11-3648.
168. BAKER, supra note 4, at 27.
169. Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article
23(2)(a) of Regulation No 1/2003, 2006 O.J. (C 210) 2, ¶ 25 (EC).
170. Case T-329/01, Archer Daniels Midland v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. II-3255,
¶ 141.
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to deeper reform-than a stable and satisfactory solution, which
would entail a separation of the functions now all in the hands of the
European Commission. Whether or not ongoing criticisms will affect
future policy reforms, they are certainly an element that must be
taken into account when addressing the issue of deterrence and
criminal sanctions against cartels, and they may well play a role in
opening the door to a more serious policy debate about the role of
criminal sanctions in antitrust law and policy.
2. The Constitutionality of Administrative Monetary Penalties
(AMPs) in Canada
The issue of the substantive nature of monetary fines also
emerged in Canada in the context of reviewable practices. In 2009,
amendments to the Competition Acti1v introduced administrative
monetary penalties (AMPs) for breach of Section 79 related to abuse
of dominance. The Competition Tribunal can now impose a maximum
of a CAD 10 million penalty for the first order and a maximum of
CAD 15 million for subsequent orders. The amount is then adjusted
according to aggravating or mitigating factors.1 72 Even though
Section 79 (3.3) clarifies that such penalties are justified in order to
promote compliance with the Competition Act and not to punish the
offender, the constitutionality of administrative monetary penalties
has been challenged for being de facto penal sanctions.17 3 Some
critiques have been based on the fact that, when taking into account
all the aggravating factors, the penalties may go beyond what is
strictly necessary to promote compliance, exceeding what would be
required to internalize the costs of anti-competitive practices. The
result is that the penalties play a denunciatory role more consistent
with criminal law than with civil standards.174 As a consequence, the
constitutional protection associated with criminal matters would
require a standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" rather than
the civil standard of "balance of probabilities."
In R. v. Wigglesworth, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed
that monetary penalties may fall within Section 11 of the Charter of
Rights and Freedom,175 according to which any person charged with
171. Competition Act, supra note 2, § 79 (3.1).
172. According to section 79 (3.2) these factors include revenue and profits
affected by the practice, the party's financial situation, the previous history of
compliance with the Act, and any other relevant factor. Id. § 79(3.2).
173. Comm'r of Competition v. Gestion Lebski, Inc., 2006 Competition Trib. 32,
T 45 (Can.).
174. Grant Bishop, The Economic Consequences and Constitutionality of
Administrative Monetary Penalties for Abuse of Dominance, 26 CAN. COMPETITION L.
REv. 37, 40 (2013).
175. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, § 11(d).
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an offense in criminal and penal matters has the right to be
"presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." In its
decision, the Court rejected the argument that the penalties fell
within Section 11, but it concluded that there are two distinct
categories of "criminal and penal matters": proceedings that are
"criminal in nature" and proceedings that may have "true penal
consequences."176 Accordingly, the Court concluded that large fines
may entail penal consequences if they are imposed to redress the
wrong done to society rather than to maintain internal discipline
within the limited sphere of activity.1 7 7 More recently, in Rowan v.
Ontario Securities Commission, the constitutionality of
administrative monetary penalties imposed for breaches of the
Securities Act was also challenged.'78 The constitutional argument
advanced by the appellants was that penalties imposed under Section
127(1)(g) are so severe as to be in effect penal sanctions. The Court
rejected the argument on the ground that penalties of up to CAD 1
million were necessary to remove economic incentives for non-
compliance, and. that it was important that the administrative
penalty would not simply be viewed as a "licensing fee" for illegal
market activities. The constitutionality of administrative monetary
fines then re-emerged in two cases involving Section 74.1 of the
Competition Act. Commissioner of Competition v. Gestion Lebski,
Inc.179 confirmed the constitutionality of administrative monetary
penalties under Section 74.1 of the Securities Act, which deals with
deceptive marketing practices, on the ground that they were aimed at
promoting compliance rather than denunciation. Eight years later,
Section 74.1 was challenged again by Rogers Communication,18 0 but
the Ontario Supreme Court of Justice rejected the constitutional
challenge, confirming that AMPs did not engage protections under
Section 11 of the Charter.
By way of comparison with the ECHR case law, some
clarifications seem necessary. First, when Gestion Lebski was
decided, the maximum amount for AMP under Section 74.1(1) was
only CAD 100,000 and CAD 200,000 for a second order, a
considerably lower amount compared to that which can be imposed
176. The "true penal consequence test" was defined in paragraph 561 of the
decision: "a true penal consequence which would attract the application of s. 11 is
imprisonment or a fine which by its magnitude would appear to be imposed for the
purpose of redressing the wrong done to society at large rather than to the
maintenance of internal discipline within the limited sphere of activity." R. v.
Wigglesworth, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 541, 559 (Can.).
177. Id. at 566.
178. Rowan v. Ontario Sec. Comm'n, 2012 O.N.C.A. 208, 1 4 (Can. Ont. C.A.).
179. Comm'r of Competition v. Gestion Lebski, Inc., 2006 Competition Trib. 32,
T 104 (Can.).
180. Comm'r of Competition v. Chatr Wireless Inc., 2014 O.N.S.C. 1146 (Can.
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
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today,1 8 1 and the AMP imposed on Rogers was CAD 500,000,
significantly below the maximum amount of CAD 10 and CAD 15
million. 182 This may raise doubts about the possibility of extending
these dicta to a more generalized level.
Second, for the calculation of AMPs, aggravating factors may
contain punitive elements more in line with criminal law. In this
regard, the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in Martineau v.
MNR1 83 confirms that a penalty may be criminal in nature when
"sentencing factors" are the basis of the calculation, rather than
purely economic terms. Following the reasoning from Wigglesworth,
and despite the recognition that the absolute magnitude of a
monetary penalty is in itself not decisive to its characterization as
criminal,184 when the penalty exceeds the harm, or the method of
calculation displays some punitive elements, issues of
constitutionality may still arise. Lastly, a distinction between
deterrence and compliance seems incongruent. In Chatr Wireless, the
Court held that "an administrative monetary penalty cannot be
imposed with a view to punishment or deterring others"18 5 but can be
imposed to induce compliance with the Competition Act. If
deterrence-based criminal fines are set to a level that at least equals
the gain or the harm caused, there seems to be no substantive
difference between deterrence and compliance. Such distinction is
therefore problematic.
In conclusion, the Canadian debate about the nature of
administrative monetary penalties presents some similarities to the
European struggle concerning the nature of antitrust fines. Besides
the formal distinctions found in the case law and potential criticisms
of the conclusions therein, both jurisdictions reach the same outcome
in confirming the legitimacy of civil proceedings for antitrust fines
that display some criminal-like elements. Nonetheless, this
comparison also highlights an important difference. In Canada, a
specialized Tribunal, rather than the same administrative authority
in charge of investigations and enforcement, imposes administrative
monetary penalties. This institutional difference makes a significant
difference when comparing the two otherwise convergent policy
outcomes: even discounting for the differences between the two legal
traditions, having high level of fines imposed by an integrated
administrative agency in charge of all procedural functions still raises
181. See Bishop, supra note 174, at 48.
182. Court orders $500,000 administrative monetary penalty in Rogers-Chatr
matter, COMPETITION BuREAU (Feb. 24, 2014),
http://www.competitionbureau.ge.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03675.html
[https://perma.cc/BGJ4-UTMCV] (archived Oct. 23, 2017).
183. Martineau v. Minister of Nat'l Revenue, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 737, 754 (Can.).
184. Canada (Attorney General) v. U.S. Steel Corp., [20111 F.C. 742, T 74.
185. Comm'r of Competition v. Chatr Wireless Inc., 2014 O.N.S.C. 1146, ¶ 51
(Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.).
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some questions about due process guarantees. The institutional
aspect of cartel criminalization should therefore take this tension into
account.
B. Trade-Offs and Institutional Models of Enforcement
So far, the discussion has been focused on the potential de facto
criminal nature of fines and the shortfalls of the current
administrative model of adjudication. The second institutional
dimension of cartel criminalization concerns the different model of
enforcement required to meet criminal law standards. Supposing that
there was a hypothetical consensus about the criminal law nature of
current administrative fines, or about the need to introduce new
criminal sanctions for deterrent purposes, what would be the
consequences of introducing a criminal law system of enforcement?
This subpart analyzes the various trade-offs associated with different
institutional models of enforcement.
Trebilcock and lacobucci identify three basic models of
competition law institutions: a bifurcated judicial model, in which
specialized investigative and enforcement authorities bring formal
complaints before the courts, as is the case in Canada for price-fixing
conspiracies and in the United States with respect to the Department
of Justice; a bifurcated agency model, in which specialized
investigative and enforcement agencies bring formal complaints
before separate, specialized adjudicative agencies, such as the
Canadian Competition Tribunal for reviewable practices; and the
integrated agency model, in which a single specialized agency
undertakes investigative, enforcement, and adjudicative activities.186
The European regime falls within this latter category. An integrated
agency model, where the Commission acts as police, prosecutor, and
judge, and EU courts review the administrative decisions, was
historically influenced by the civil law's "inquisitorial" model of
decision making and justified by the need to foster single market
integration and create and build a stronger competition law culture
within Europe.1 8 7
The authors also identify various trade-offs that policy makers
inevitably face when designing competition law institutions.1 8 8 In
particular, in relation to the balance between administrative
efficiency and due process, the authors identify, on the one hand, a
high level of protection of due process values but poor results in terms
'01
186. Trebilcock & lacobucci, supra note 12, at 459.
187. Lianos & Andreangeli, supra note 13, at 389-90.
188. Trebilcock and lacobucci identify the following trade-offs: independence
versus accountability, expertise versus detachment, transparency versus
confidentiality, administrative efficiency versus due process, and predictability versus
flexibility. Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 12, at 457-59.
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of timeliness and process costs associated with a bifurcated judicial
model. On the other hand, in relation to the integrated agency model,
the authors claim strong qualities in terms of expertise and
administrative efficiency, which come at, the expense of due process
guarantees. This finding is consistent, for example, with the
assessment of mergers in Europe, where cases must be decided
within strict deadlines by a body with strong technical expertise but
with serious risks of prosecutorial bias and with limited scope to
challenge the Commission's findings before the EU courts, given the
margin of appreciation in the analysis of economic evidence and
results.
However, the same trade-off appears less stringent in non-
merger cases. At first sight, an integrated agency model with the
administrative body carrying out all the functions provides a
significant reduction of costs and increased timeliness of decision
making compared to a bifurcated judicial or agency model.
Nonetheless, the internal checks and balances in the administrative
phase required by the ECHR standards inevitably involve a
duplication of tasks and a non-trivial increase in enforcement costs.
The introduction of the peer panel review, for instance, implies that
officials other than the first investigator have to acquire knowledge of
the case and re-examine the assessment made by the first case-
hander.'89 Such costs are often further increased given the frequency
of application for judicial review before the EU courts.19 0 In addition,
the EU courts cannot adopt a de novo decision but are entitled only to
annul and re-submit the case to the Commission for a new
determination, which will involve an additional administrative
proceeding.1 91 This specifically has happened in a price fixing
investigation,1 92 where a fourteen year-long case, which began with a
Commission decision initially reviewed by the Court of First Instance
and then annulled by the Court of Justice, was subsequently
readopted with the due amendments by the Commission and then re-
appealed to the Court of First Instance and further appealed to the
Court of Justice.19 3 This back-and-forth between competition
authority and reviewing courts significantly undermines the
efficiency of proceedings, in terms of both costs and timeliness.
On a similar note, administrative judicial review is in principle a
faster and less costly procedure compared to an appeal on the merit,
189. Wouter P.J. Wils, The Combination of the Investigative and Prosecutorial
Function and the Adjudicative Function in EC Antitrust Enforcement: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 27 WORLD COMPETITION 201, 219 (2004).
190. Id. at 222.
191. Case T-68, Societa Italiana Vetro Spa v. Comm'n, 1992 E.C.R. 11-1403,
1 319.
192. Joined Cases C-238/99 P, C-244/ 99, C-247/ 99, C-250/ 99, C-252/ 99 & C-
254/ 99, 2002 E.C.R. 1-8618, 1-8628.
193. Id. IT 1-34.
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where courts substitute their own decisions for the previous decisions.
However, the ECHR standard of "full jurisdiction" requires an in-
depth review of cases, including the economic assessments made by
the Commission. This, coupled with the inevitable back-and-forth
with the Commission, may significantly limit the advantages of
judicial review and reduce administrative efficiency, ending with a
lose-lose situation in regards to the abovementioned trade-off. At the
same time, a significant implication for efficiency would be the
necessary adoption of a stringent standard of proof required to
comply with higher criminal requirements, which would necessarily
entail more enforcement costs, time-consuming analysis, and lower
probability of conviction. Nonetheless, even taking this element into
account, it may still be argued that the burdens affecting the current
administrative process make a criminal model of enforcement a
potential substitute in terms of procedural efficiency.
C. Institutional Priorities
The European Parliament has recognized that "the issue of the
compatibility of the Community's competition procedure as a whole
with Article 6 ECHR will be particularly important if, as seems
probable, the fines which can be imposed by the Commission come to
be regarded as criminal penalties for the purpose of Article 6,"194 and
the EU courts confirmed that "undertakings accused of violations of
the competition rules . . . must for this reason enjoy the guarantees
that are provided for procedures of a penal character."9 5
As the Article attempted to show, there is a complex
interrelationship between substantial and institutional challenges
that must be addressed when designing the introduction of individual
antitrust sanctions. From a normative and empirical perspective, the
problem of cartel deterrence justifies the introduction of a diverse set
of sanction mechanisms both on corporations and individuals, in
order to overcome the inherent limits of monetary fines and to
address specific incentive problems that operate on an individual
level. Individual sanctions can overcome corporations' inability to pay
and principal-agent problems, increase the moral stigma associated
with collusion, and enhance propensity to cooperate with competition
authorities.
However, despite their desirability, individual sanctions are
unlikely to become a priority as a stand-alone proposal, given the
legal, political, and institutional consequences that would follow. On
the contrary, the solution to the problem of under-deterrence of
cartels appears to be ultimately conditional to the political
194. European Parliament position, 1st reading or single reading, 2002 O.J. (C 72)
236.
195. Case C-199/92 P, Huls v. Comm'n, 1999 E.C.R. 1-4287.
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desirability of improving the shortcomings of the current institutional
model of enforcement more than the normative and empirical
justifications for individual sanctions. In this regard, institutional
challenges have already emerged from the debate concerning the
potential de facto criminal character of monetary fines and from the
risks of prosecutorial bias associated with an integrated agency
model. The compatibility of the current administrative model with
ECHR standards is based on a characterization of competition law
under the category of "minor criminal offenses," which, at least in
relation to cartel cases, is questionable.
Further, the ECHR conditions of adequate checks and balances
within the administrative phase and "full judicial review" is not
satisfactorily met in all cases. In addition, the usual trade-off between
administrative efficiency and due process may not necessarily apply
in the context of cartel and unilateral abuse cases, given that the
abovementioned ECHR conditions create a significant burden on the
enforcement procedure that may nullify the advantages of an
administrative model of adjudication.
In sum, while the two separate scholarly debates on
criminalization-ECHR due, process concerns and the desirability of
increased cartel deterrence-are two faces of the same coin, this
Article suggests a priority between these two important dimensions.
In particular, it concludes that despite the strong justifications for the
introduction of individual sanctions at the European level, such
reform appears to be conditional on the political desirability of
improving the due process procedural efficiency trade-offs at the
institutional level, for instance by considering a possible shift toward
a bifurcated judicial model. Such a shift would potentially increase
the levels of due process protection, meet all the ECHR requirements,
and also eliminate many of the barriers against introducing
individual antitrust sanctions for deterrent purposes, while not
necessarily entailing a costlier and time-consuming model of
enforcement. Certainly, without the willingness to reform the current
system of enforcement, individual sanctions are unlikely to become a
feasible option in Europe.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to address the question of cartel
criminalization in Europe from a broad perspective that takes into
account both the need to ensure deterrence and to address the
institutional design questions associated with criminalization. The
high levels of fines are a symptom of the inadequacies of a system
that relies exclusively on monetary fines imposed on corporations to
effectively deter cartels, and vice versa, under-deterrence stems from
the impracticability of introducing individual sanctions within the
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current institutional model. This Article argues that more attention
should be paid to the shortcomings of the current form of enforcement
and the desirability of introducing new institutional models, as it
appears to be the only feasible way for individual sanctions to become
a priority at the European level. A search for a better institutional
model is therefore recommended before hoping to see an optimal
sanction regime ever becoming a reality in Europe.
